



European Digital Media Observatory

CLIMATE DISINFORMATION RISES IN JULY, CEUTA MIGRATION CRISIS LOOMS OVER AUGUST

Monthly Report no. 2 - EDMO fact-checking network

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Disinformation detected in Europe in July followed a recurring pattern, piling up around events and crises that were trending in the news and, consequently, on social media platforms. Many of these events were neither new nor unpredictable: as often happens during summers characterised by heatwaves, a great deal of disinformation focused on climate change, spreading denialism and conspiracy theories, as well as out-of-context images used as clickbait to exaggerate the effects of the heat. Disinformation about the FIFA World Cup, which had already gone viral in June, continued in July, while in the Western Balkans, as expected, the anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide prompted new waves of disinformation.

But in the last 48 hours of the month, an unexpected crisis changed the scenario: the arrival in the Spanish exclave of Ceuta of around 70,000 migrants from Morocco sparked a huge wave of disinformation in Europe, which was largely fuelled by disinformation circulating in the African country. In the next report, covering disinformation detected in August, EDMO will be able to provide more detailed information about this phenomenon and its consequences.


Even if the migration wave was not caused by a single actor, foreign or domestic, with the specific goal of creating a crisis in Europe, it is clear that many actors immediately exploited the situation to foster disinformation narratives that aligned with their interests: sowing divisions, promoting extremism, dividing European societies, attacking political enemies, and so on.

And it is also to be noted that, with an adequate infrastructure – built around cooperation between fact-checkers from different continents and strong monitoring capacities – phenomena like this one could have been intercepted in advance and maybe even partially prevented.

EU-based organisations that contributed to the report: 15min, AFP, APA - Austria Press Agency, CORRECTIV, Demagog.cz, Demagog.sk, Demagog.org.pl, Delfi Lithuania, Delfi Estonia, Dpa, DW, EFE Verifica, Ellinika Hoaxes, Facta/Pagella Politica, Factcheck Vlaanderen, Fact-check Cyprus, Faktograf, Funky Citizens/Factual.ro, Greece Fact Check, Infoveritas, Källkritikbyrå, Lakmusz, Maldita.es, Newtral, Oštro, Polígrafo, Re:Baltica, TjekDet, The Journal, Verificat.

Other European organisations that contributed to the report: AFP, Belarusian Investigative Center, FakeNews Tracker (fakenews.rs), Doğruluk Payı, Faktoje.al, Geofacts, Istinomer.rs, Istinomjer, hibrid.info, Metamorphosis Foundation, Myth Detector, Raskrinkavanje.ba, Teyit, VoxUkraine.

THE FIVE FALSE STORIES WITH THE WIDEST CIRCULATION IN EUROPE



- Out of context videos showing acts of vandalism after the France-Morocco
- Transphobic content against Elliot Page, starring in Nolan's *The Odyssey*
- ▲ Out of context or AI generated content about Iran attacks on US targets in the Gulf
- ◆ Traffic lights melting in Italy and Germany because of the heatwave
- ★ The brawl that broke out after the World Cup final was due to comments by Spanish Gavi on corruption and FIFA's Gianni Infantino

DISINFORMATION DETECTED IN THE EU*

**Including Norway, that was already in the geographical scope of the Monthly Briefs*

CLIMATE CHANGE DISINFORMATION REGISTERS SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN JULY

The 30 organisations that are part of the EDMO fact-checking network in the European Union and Norway, and that contributed to this report, published a total of 1,397 fact-checking articles in July 2026. Of these articles, 119 (8%) focused on Ukraine-related disinformation; 109 (8%) on disinformation related to immigration; 104 (7%) on climate change-related disinformation; 97 (7%) on health-related disinformation (excluding COVID-19); 87 (6%) on disinformation related to the EU; 39 (3%) on the crisis in Palestine; 25 (2%) on disinformation about LGBTQ+ and gender issues; 22 (2%) on COVID-19-related disinformation; and 22 (2%) on the war between Israel/USA and Iran.



During the month of July, consistently with the trend recorded in previous months, the two most targeted topics by disinformation were the war in Ukraine and immigration, although the share of false news on both topics decreased by two percentage points compared to June 2026. Disinformation on immigration is expected to rise in August with the Ceuta crisis that began on July 30th 2026.

As is often the case in summer, especially on occasion of heatwaves or other extreme phenomena, the share of false news and denialist theories on climate change increased. In July 2026 the percentage of detected disinformation on these issues rose by three points, making it the third most targeted topic of the month. The share of false news regarding the European Union also increased by one percentage point and it seems on the rise after the drop registered in March 2026.

The share of disinformation on the other topics monitored by these briefs remained stable, with only minor fluctuations.


% of related disinformation on total detected disinformation, by topic

COVID-19
 European Union
 Crisis in Palestine and Israel
 Us/Israel vs Iran conflict
 LGBTQ+
 Ukraine
 Health
 Climate change
 Immigration




AI-GENERATED DISINFORMATION QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE EU

After the drop recorded in April and May 2026, the share of false news created or manipulated using AI increased throughout the months of June and July. Out of 1,397 fact-checking articles, 253 used this manipulation strategy, representing 18% of the total, a percentage close to the record of January and March 2026 (20%).



In July, AI was often used to attack political figures such as the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky: throughout Europe, disinformation circulated an AI picture of Zelensky behind bulletproof glass. In the Czech Republic, AI-generated content was used to attack the President Petr Pavel and the First Lady Eva Pavlová. A doctored image was used as purported proof that the Constitutional Court is not independent and makes decisions in the President's favor, and a video circulated the news that Pavlová angrily reacted to a leak of documents allegedly proving that she used public funds to buy jewellery worth four million crowns.

Following the wave of anti-LGBTQ+ content spread during the Pride month, AI was also used to generate a video in which a dog is seen attacking a woman who allegedly identifies as a "female dog".



DISINFORMATION NARRATIVES' ANALYSIS:

1) WILDFIRES IN EUROPE FUEL CLIMATE CHANGE DENIALIST DISINFORMATION

Given the wildfires spreading throughout Southern Europe and the heatwave affecting the subcontinent, disinformation on climate change kept spreading. In between viral images that exaggerated the effect of these extreme weather events, there was a leading unfounded narrative: wildfires in France and Spain allegedly have nothing to do with climate change, but rather they were deliberately started to make way for renewable energy plants, housing developments or solar farms.

Denialism then followed, with claims that high temperatures recorded in Spain in the 50s contradict the existence of climate change, and that the heatwave in Europe is a case of "climate hysteria" and is simply a warm summer. Other denialist claims went deeper and argued that the June heatwave was caused by the urban heat island effect rather than CO₂, or that a study shows that human CO₂ emissions don't cause current global warming.

Amidst extreme weather events and wildfires, politics and climate narratives also intertwined: for example, claims circulated the false news that Morocco sent four seaplanes to help fight Spain's wildfires or that it refused to cooperate. Images also purportedly showed an Italian aircraft fighting wildfires in Spain.



2) “CHAT CONTROL” LAW EXTENSION FUELS ANTI-EU SENTIMENT

On July 9th the European Parliament approved the extension of a temporary regulation that allows messages to be scanned to detect child abuse content, commonly referred to as “Chat control 1.0”. This fueled a legitimate debate around the topic, but also the circulation of false stories: claims circulated that the recently approved regulation is a brand-new law forcing platforms to scan all private messages, and accusations of mass surveillance.

As a byproduct of such claims, anti-EU narrative gained traction: false news claimed that the EU Parliament has voted for the digital euro as a key step towards abolishing cash, or that the government will monitor your purchases or limit your savings. This reinforces the longstanding narrative that depicts the EU as a dictatorial institution, which in July was declined into specific stories of various countries: in Romania, claims circulated that you risk 20 years in prison for digging a well in your yard because of a law stemming from a European directive, or that 1,800 sheep and goats from the Buzau region have been killed on the orders of the EU following an outbreak of sheep and goat pox. In Greece, disinformation circulated that the French assisted-dying bill was dictated by Brussels and targeted people with mental illness, with only 48 hours to withdraw.




THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DISINFORMATION STORIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL:



A referendum is required for the deployment of nuclear weapons in the country



Odemira City Council removed the Portuguese flag from its flagpole and hoisted foreign ones given the significant number of immigrants



The Greek flag is missing at the Evros tripoint while Bulgarian and Turkish flags are flown



Russian drones that entered the country in July had the consent of the Romanian president



DISINFORMATION IN EUROPE* OUTSIDE THE EU

**Europe refers to the countries of the Council of Europe, plus Kosovo, Belarus and Russia*

DISINFORMATION NARRATIVES' ANALYSIS:

1) CLIMATE CHANGE DENIALISM AND ANTI-EU SENTIMENT



Also outside the EU, climate change denialism took traction in July: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a claim circulated that global warming is a hoax because some of the highest recorded temperatures in the Balkans occurred decades ago. In various other countries of the region, conspiracy theories were also shared, especially in relation to the HAARP Program (High-frequency Active Auroral Research), which allegedly caused a storm in North Macedonia and the heatwave in France, Italy and Spain.



The approval of the temporary framework “Chat control” (see slide n.9) fueled anti-EU sentiment also outside the European Union, especially in Georgia: there claims circulated that the European Parliament adopted a law according to which private correspondence will no longer be protected, or that the EU is declaring “war on cash” and that the euro currency will no longer be available in cash from 2028. Anti-EU sentiment also intertwined with disinformation related to climate change, and claims circulated that Germany is purportedly calling on people to not have babies due to climate change.

2) IN THE BALKANS DISINFORMATION ON THE SREBRENICA GENOCIDE FUELS INTERETHNIC CONFLICT



With the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide, on July 11th, disinformation on the massacre heavily circulated in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, false news claimed that the Tribunal in The Hague established that 4,100 people were killed in Srebrenica and rejected the figure of around 8,000 victims; fueling this narrative, another claims used isolated errors in victim records to falsely suggest that the number of victims was deliberately inflated. In Serbia, pro-government tabloids recycled recurring distortion narratives, describing the genocide as "fictional" and reframing it as an attack on Serbia. In both countries, distorted stories purported the narrative that that anyone in Serbia who acknowledges the genocide is declaring the entire Serbian people "genocidal".

As a byproduct of this narrative, a false claim circulated in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the photograph of a boy murdered in Serbia in 2008 was photoshopped into images of a memorial displayed in Bratunac to discredit Serbian wartime victims.



In Kosovo, pro-US and pro-Israel disinformation was detected: claims circulated that US President Donald Trump called on NATO to accept Kosovo as a member, or that threatened Serbia over Kosovo (see slide n.16). False news also claimed that an "historic agreement" between Kosovo and Israel would have granted the protection of northern Kosovo with 1000 Israeli soldiers.

3) KREMLIN NARRATIVES PUSH THEIR WAY INTO UKRAINE AND BELARUS



In Ukraine, disinformation targeting President Volodymyr Zelensky circulates like in the rest of Europe: in July, a post falsely claimed that Romanian customs had seized 75 kg of cocaine coming from Ukraine and Zelensky's portrait was placed on the drug packages. Anti-EU content also widely circulated in the country through fake TV broadcasts: according to a fake Euronews service, Poland is deporting 50,000 Ukrainian refugees, while according to a fake France 24 video, France will allocate €80 million to train Ukrainian military recruitment officers and install facial recognition cameras in Ukraine.


Other claims circulated in Ukraine heavily fueled the Kremlin narrative: a fake video imitating the Institute for the Study of War claimed that Ukraine's Security Service planned to stage explosions at several civilian infrastructure sites and then blame Russia, and a Telegram post also claimed that Ukraine had begun hiding fuel trucks near school buildings. To further push the pro-Russian narrative, posts were circulated to falsely claim that an arbitration court in The Hague had officially recognised Crimea as Russian and rejected all Ukrainian claims as groundless.



Pro-Russian false stories also circulated in Belarus, where it was claimed that since the Russian New Wave festival left Latvia, music festivals have no longer been held in the Baltic states.

Following a similar narrative, anti-EU sentiment also gained traction, with an expert from the First National Channel of Belarusian Radio stating that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have "no railroads, no transportation system" after joining the European Union.

4) FALSE NEWS IN GEORGIA REVOLVE AROUND THE GOVERNMENT'S PRO-RUSSIAN STANCE



Claims targeting the war in Ukraine widely circulated also in Georgia. Among these, false news claimed that the Polish court concluded that the sabotage of the North Stream pipeline constituted an element of Ukraine's self-defense against Russia. A fragment of a television interview with the leader of the Ahali party was also shared on social media, out of its context, to suggest that if Georgia were to join the war against Russia, then it would be able to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine and gain access to money. The overarching narrative, according to *Geofacts* fact-checkers, is that the EU in particular wishes to pull Georgia into war against Russia by using political opposition and critical voices. The alleged interference of the EU in Georgia's politics was also fueled by the unsubstantiated claim that the current EU ambassador to Georgia attended anti-government protests in the country.

5) DISINFORMATION IN TURKEY FOSTERS NATIONALIST SENTIMENT



After the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7-8, disinformation claims spread that Icelandic Prime Minister Kristrún Frostadóttir said Turks welcomed her "very humbly" and that Turkey was her "second home". Another claim fostering nationalist sentiment was made by self-proclaimed historian Ramazan Sevinç, who alleged that excavations stopped at Troy after archaeologists discovered the Trojans were Turkish. On the topic of international relations, false news claimed that Germany had newly lifted visa requirements for 62 countries, including Israel but excluding Turkey. Throughout the month, disinformation also focused on national politics, with an AI generated image of people symbolically hanging the photo of comedian Deniz Göktaş, who was arrested in July on charges of "insulting" the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and "publicly inciting hatred and hostility."

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DISINFORMATION STORIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL OUTSIDE THE EU



Border crossings
between Serbia and
Bosnia are being
abolished



US President Donald
Trump had threatened
Serbia with bombing or
declared war on it over
Kosovo



The “Bucharest Treaty on
the Partition of Macedonia”
has an additional clause
referring to a future
independent Macedonia
and its name



A protester of the
"Flamingo Revolution"
demands the resignation
of Prime Minister Rama
and the Islamization of
Albanians



FOREIGN INFORMATION MANIPULATION AND INTERFERENCE ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

In July 2026 Russian-linked operations remained highly visible through broadcaster impersonation, media laundering and manipulated audiovisual content. The strongest attributable cases involve: Operation **Storm-1516**, e.g. linked fabrications targeting Ukraine and Volodymyr Zelenskyy; **Matryoshka**, e.g. associated Telegram assets counterfeiting Western institutions (for both cases, see slide n.19); and a deceptive prank-call operation by **Vovan and Lexus** (see slide n. 20) subsequently amplified through Russian state media, and the Pravda Network's own Estonian, Latvian and EU-facing subdomains.

At the same time, collected data in July shows growing reliance on **synthetic local messengers**. In particular a case of AI-generated "Polish soldier" personas were AI-generated to spread anti-Ukrainian narratives from the point of "authority" (see slide n.19).

However, the Ceuta migration crisis has resonated the most at the end of July and we continue to monitor the situation. It has shown **coordinated cross-platform mobilisation** and consequential false information, but the evidence does not establish a foreign-state sponsor or single directing actor (see slides n.22-30).

ANALYSIS OF ACTORS AND OPERATIONAL MODALITIES

1. Matryoshka: Fabricated broadcasters and institutional impersonation

In Ukraine, *VoxCheck* documented a false *Euronews* video claiming Poland would deport 50,000 Ukrainian refugees, a false *Politico* video claiming the United Kingdom strengthened protection for Valerii Zaluzhnyi after a Monaco terrorist attack, a false *France 24* video alleging €80 million French programme to train Ukrainian recruitment officers and install facial-recognition cameras, and a fabricated *Institute for the Study of War-style* video attributing planned attacks on civilian infrastructure to Ukraine's security service.

2. Storm-1516: Fabrication anchored in real events and authentic media

Two cases were recorded by *Demagog Poland*. The first used altered *Associated Press* footage and false *BBC* branding to claim that Olena Zelenska wore jewellery stolen from France's Lalique Museum. The second used a real anti-mobilisation protest in Lviv as the anchor for a fabricated story claiming that authorities tortured and killed 43 protesters.

3. Synthetic authority: AI-generated people and voices as messengers

Accounts of "Voice of Polish Soldiers", "Voice of the Military" and "Polish Defence" were detected by *Demagog Poland* across Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and YouTube, which used AI-generated soldiers to speak about Ukraine, refugees, the EU, Germany and Polish politics. In Georgia, *Myth Detector* documented a Russian-language video that placed an AI-generated voice over authentic Alice Weidel footage, co-chair of German far-right AfD party, to fabricate attacks on Zelensky.

4. Deceptive interpersonal access: Vovan and Lexus

Russian “pranksters” Vovan and Lexus (Vladimir Kuznetsov and Alexey Stolyarov, Russian comedy duo, known to “prank” Western politicians) impersonated Ukrainian official Rustem Umerov during a call with Estonian presidential security adviser Madis Roll. An edited version was then used to claim Estonia was prepared to help Ukraine organise attacks on St Petersburg, which was further amplified by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova and the Pravda subdomains in Estonia, Latvia, and the EU.

5. Domestic-looking laundering and persistent national-language nodes

Local actors like “Zaorane” social media account in Poland and Alina Lipp, a German blogger, acted as indigenous voices and amplifiers of various narratives. “Zaorane” published predominantly anti-Ukrainian material, while Alina Lipp, as an actor repeatedly identified by *CORRECTIV* to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda, spread false information on Ukraine encouraging Indian men to move there to start a family or work.

ACTOR TAXONOMY

- **Russian-linked operation clusters.** Operation Storm-1516-linked accounts and Matryoshka- associated channels producing fabricated or impersonated media content targeting Ukraine and European support for Ukraine.
- **Recurring national-language amplifiers.** Accounts and outlets repeatedly flagged by fact-checkers for pro-Kremlin, anti-Ukrainian or anti-Western content, including local-language actors that can make externally aligned narratives appear indigenous.
- **Synthetic and deceptive personas.** AI-generated “soldiers”, falsified expert identities and false/ imitative official communities that manufacture social credibility.
- **Commercial amplification infrastructure.** Engagement-farming or “Viet spam” assets that primarily monetise sensational content written with AI, but can reproduce anti-Ukrainian narratives with geopolitical effects.
- **Migration mobilisation networks.** Cross-platform communities combining peer-to-peer coordination with misleading legal, asylum and reception information in the Ceuta case. Their coordination is evidenced; foreign sponsorship is not.

CASE STUDY: CEUTA MIGRATION CRISIS

The Ceuta migration crisis, which emerged in the second half of July, represents the month's most consequential case, when digital manipulation directly preceded the crisis. Between the night of 30–31 July and early August 2026, an estimated 72,000 people crossed irregularly from Morocco into the Spanish autonomous city of Ceuta, via the Tarajal breakwater and by breaching the border fence near Fnideq (Castillejos in Spanish). Spain's Interior Ministry reported that roughly 70,000 had been returned to Morocco within days, and at least 141 deaths were recorded in connection with the crossing attempts.


The cross-platform mobilisation infrastructure of late July was mapped out by *Maldita*, which monitored 21 Facebook groups connected with the July 30–31 crossing and subsequent plans. The largest analysed group had more than 190,000 members. The organisation was visible before the mass crossing: on July 21 a user sought experienced people for a fence crossing; the first WhatsApp invitation found by *Maldita* appeared in a Facebook group on July 27. Between the end of July and the first days of August, at least 19 different WhatsApp invitation links were shared at least 36 times in Facebook groups linked to Ceuta, Fnideq and *harraga* communities (note: the *harraga* — in English, “those who burn” — refers to illegal immigrants from North Africa who want to cross the Mediterranean to Europe and usually burn their documents in the course of their journey).



Messages intercepted by [Maldita.es](https://maldita.es) on Ceuta coordination.

MULTI-PLATFORM OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Different platforms performed distinct roles in the mobilisation chain, replacing simple cross-posting with functional operational segmentation.



MECHANICS OF LEGAL WEAPONIZATION

Authentic Legal Reality

Source: June 29 Spanish Supreme Court Ruling.

Fact: Banned immediate 'hot returns' for migrants arriving by swimming, requiring a standard maximum 72-hour formal return procedure.

Crucial Context: It did not grant a right to remain in Spain or the EU.

Strategic
Omission

Viral Decontextualization

The FIMI Resemblance: Complete removal of the '72-hour return procedure' clause.

The Message: Translated a procedural shift into a false 'open border / no expulsion' signal.

The Amplification Burst: On July 30, exact identical Arabic phrasing was published 215 times within hours, heavily boosted by Moroccan influencers (e.g., Youssef Belhaissi, 1.3M followers).


THE CEUTA CRISIS IN NUMBERS

Event Metrics

~72,000 irregular border crossings
(July 20-31, peaking July 30-31).



~70,000 returns by Aug 4.



Digital Footprint:

1,171	727	150k
Arabic-language posts	unique users	reactions across 200+ groups.

Confirmed data:

- multi-platform operational architecture
- highly repetitive amplification
- official legal ruling misinterpretation

ASSESSMENT

The Ceuta case **does not, on current evidence, point to a single identifiable state sponsor**, and the underlying migratory event was genuine rather than fabricated.

It nonetheless displays behavioural hallmarks significant to FIMI analysis independent of attribution:

- near-identical text posted at very high frequency within a short period of time;
- the strategic simplification of legal ruling;
- purpose-built operational infrastructure that persisted and re-organised around a new target date within 48 hours;
- and rapid onward recirculation of reused footage.

AMPLIFICATION OF KREMLIN'S MEDIA MACHINERY

Though attribution to a specific (state) actor behind the Ceuta crisis remains unresolved, the Kremlin's media machinery spread information about the crises.

For example, the pro-Kremlin Telegram propaganda channel **Rybar** elaborated how the Crisis “did not emerge from nowhere”. According to GladiOS social media monitoring tool, this message or its variations appeared in **86 posts**, including various language versions of Rybar network, and had over **763k views**. You can see the visualisation of the post's dissemination on the next slide, n.29-30.

Rybar in English

COORDINATION OF ASSAULT ON SPANISH CEUTA VIA SOCIAL MEDIA

CREATING PUBLIC GROUPS FOR SWIMS TO CEUTA

ASSAULT ON SPANISH ENCLAVE OF CEUTA BY MOROCCANS, JULY 30, 2020

• Fwd from @
[Instructions for the assault]

The mass breakthrough in Ceuta did not emerge from nowhere and was not a spontaneous reaction to an "open border". For several weeks, future participants gathered in Facebook*, WhatsApp*, Instagram*, TikTok* and other communities, studied the route, shared maps, calculated distances around the Tarajal breakwater and discussed equipment.

By the time of publication, the public Instagram group Haraga Ceuta, created specifically to organize swimming expeditions, had over 78,000 members. These communities existed for weeks and continue to operate.

In such communities, people posted photographs of wetsuits and fins, pictures of those who had already reached the Spanish shore, asked about taxis to Fnideq and Bellounes, about police checkpoints, collected money for kayaks. This was not simply the spread of rumors, but mass exchange of practical information for illegal border crossing.

This is not the first such case. In 2024, TikTok spread calls for a mass breakthrough on September 15; Moroccan security forces then detained the organizers, closed beaches near Castillejos and quickly reduced the number of attempts. Thus, the authorities demonstrated that they can respond to such digital mobilization, *if they deem it necessary*.

Therefore, the current explanation of everything that happened as *"the work of smugglers"* is convenient, but does not withstand scrutiny. The main question remains the same: if the beneficiary of what happened is capable of organizing a crowd like this, providing a legislative framework and eliminating law enforcement oversight, what steps will be taken next?

High resolution infographic

English version

#infographic #Spain #Morocco #migrants
@evropar — on the brink of Europe's death


Support us

*belongs to Meta, which is recognized in the Russian Federation as an extremist organization Original msg

17 4 3 2 2

t.me/rybar_in_english/33126


17.6K Aug 1 at 13:00



Visualisation of the dissemination pattern of the post by the tool GladiOS developed by Gerulata Technologies.

ZOOM IN ON RYBAR NETWORK

English, Russian and Spanish accounts of Rybar network amplified the message.



Visualisation of the dissemination pattern of the post by the tool GladiOS developed by Gerulata Technologies.

KEY FINDINGS FOR JULY

The most significant development identified in June 2026 was the systematic duplication of Pravda Network articles on Telegra.ph. Each newly published article appeared to include an alternative link in its source code, marked with the **rel="alternate"** attribute, directing users or automated systems to a mirrored version of the same content hosted on Telegra.ph.

Finding	Evidence	Analytical significance
Authority borrowing is a recurring tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP)	False or manipulated <i>Euronews</i> , <i>Politico</i> , <i>France 24</i> , <i>BBC News</i> and <i>Institute for the Study of War</i> formats	Operators can outsource credibility to trusted brands and facilitate screenshot/video recirculation.
Synthetic authority is expanding	AI-generated Polish “soldiers”; AI-generated voice placed over Alice Weidel; AI-generated Polish border-wall video	Generative AI is used to fabricate speakers, witnesses and social roles.
Authentic footage remains highly reusable	Paris protest/riot footage repeatedly relabelled around World Cup events; Turkish pilgrimage footage relabelled as Ceuta	Low-cost recontextualization travels easily across borders and narrative domains.
Persistent national-language actors/accounts matter	Recurring pro-Kremlin or anti-Western accounts reported in Poland, Germany, Greece and North Macedonia; Pravda infrastructure persists	Influence ecosystems combine durable local reach with more disposable campaign assets.
Ceuta links spread of false information to behaviour - mass migration	Repeated legal simplification and asylum claims circulated in groups used to organise crossings	The distance between misleading information and operational decision-making was unusually short.

METHODOLOGY

The information contained in this report was collected via a questionnaire sent to the fact-checking organisations belonging to the EDMO fact-checking network (<https://edmo.eu/fact-checking-community/>).

Reference period: 1-31 July 2026. Number of respondents: 44.

FIMI section was also created with the support of the tool GladiOS developed by Gerulata Technologies.

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